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Hierarchical causality in financial economics
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University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
Hierarchical analysis is considered and a multilevel model is presented in order to explore causality,
chance and complexity in financial economics. A coupled system of models is used to describe mul-
tilevel interactions, consistent with market data: the lowest level is occupied by agents generating
the prices of individual traded assets; the next level entails aggregation of stocks into markets; the
third level combines shared risk factors with information variables and bottom-up, agent-generated
structure, consistent with conditions for no-arbitrage pricing theory; the fourth level describes mar-
ket factors which originate in the greater economy and the highest levels are described by regulated
market structure and the customs and ethics which define the nature of acceptable transactions. A
mechanism for emergence or innovation is considered and causal sources are discussed in terms of
five causation classes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coupled systems typically evolve under multiple
sources of causality and chance. Market failures at the
outset of the 21st century have highlighted that ortho-
dox economics has not been able to provide models for
stable pricing of investment securities. Multiple causes
have been discussed for financial crises5,24,25,58,70 and it
has become increasingly accepted that there are forms
of causality other than those encompassed by the tra-
ditional reductionist views arising in physics, chemistry
or economics57,82,102,107. We address the causality ques-
tion in financial economics by building a more causally
complete view of real world systems. We commence with
reviewing some of key concepts.
Many authors have contemplated models of causality
and Plato is attributed with claiming88:
Everything that becomes or changes must do
so owing to some cause; for nothing can come
to be without cause.
Aristotle is documented as one of the very earliest
theorists to delve into the nature of causation by de-
scribing four different kinds of causation, namely: ma-
terial, formal, efficient and final36,66. Since then, ideas
on causation have evolved. More recently, seminal di-
rections include the works of Simon96 et al, who devised
and improved methods for determining sources of top-
down causation in systems of differential equations and
Campbell23 et al, whose focus stemmed from the analysis
of biological systems to highlight selection as a determi-
nant for and against system features. Advances in dy-
namical systems views have led to multi-scale modelling,
where model development consistently takes into account
empirical measurements at more than one scale108,115
and multi-layer networks analysts provide a formalism
whereby distinguishable sub-networks are connected via
multiple types of connections32,99,103.
Stress-testing in the financial services typically en-
tails the investigation of top-down and bottom-up
causalities4,19,53,101 acting on institutions. Hierarchi-
cal effects have been discussed with respect to the re-
lationship between topological configuration of homoge-
nous levels and information flow57 and a graph-theoretic
method for identifying clusters and hierarchical structure
has been developed by Di Matteo et al100. Connection-
ist approaches to understanding causality relationships in
markets have been addressed in the literature by Aubin8,
where top-down causation is described by operators on
product spaces, and Farmer43,44, where complex markets
are deconstructed via an ecological systems perspective.
We investigate the applicability of a top-down causa-
tion scheme which is ordered by coarse-graining via the
perspective suggested by Auletta, Ellis and Jaeger12,36.
In this approach, foundational features in heterogenous
systems are identified and represented via averaged fea-
tures, with averaging-scales usually close to prevailing
scales of measurement for distinguishable levels in the
system. Here, a hierarchy is represented by a system of
coupled models which are applicable on different scales of
interaction. It is the resulting loss of information, as one
moves upward through scales, that can lead to the identi-
fication of laws that function relatively autonomously at
different levels. The independence of higher levels from
the details of lower levels allows phenomenological laws
to offer reasonable approximations at the higher levels
for most observations of the system.
We are led to address the concept of causally complete
models. Causally complete and causally closed models
are considered in physics, where the latter refers to a
perspective that the only kinds of causation in physical
systems are physical and the former refers to the view
that non-physical causes may be possible69. In math-
ematics, completeness carries connotations of all things
in the systems being attainable: (i) all theorems can be
proved, (ii) limits of convergent sequences exist within
the system (iii) all objects in the system can be obtained
as some representation of some core set, or (iv) all nodes
in a network can be reached from every other nodes by
a directed link.
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem exposes the real-
ity that there will always exist unanswerable questions
beyond the reach of any comprehensive mathematical
modelling framework. Analogously, there are typically
2anomalies and phenomena which will arise outside of
any attempt to model and regulate an economic system.
Thus, we consider the notion of causal completeness in
the context of being able to compare complex models by
their ability to explain phenomena or quantities which
can be observed or measured.
It is suggested by Ellis36 that there are at least five
different classes of top-down causation30,35,36, listed here
with slight variation in nomenclature:
TDC1 Algorithmic top-down causation
TDC2 Top-down causation via non-adaptive informa-
tion control
TDC3 Top-down causation via adaptive selection
TDC4 Top-down causation via feedback control of
adaptive goals
TDC5 Top-down causation with adaptive selection of
adaptive goals
In this paper, we present a simple hierarchical causal-
ity model which incorporates a plausible approximation
of empirically measurable interactions, with a variety of
top-down and bottom-up causality features, as a path
to revising prevailing theoretical foundations in finan-
cial economics. To substantiate the model proposed, we
provide a candidate for each of the distinct causation
classes listed above, to give insight into the complex na-
ture of causation and chance in financial markets. Parts
of our hierarchical model remain consistent with existing
arbitrage-free approaches to factor modelling111.
To describe our model, we commence with a review
of a seminal construct in the modelling of equity mar-
ket causality. In arbitrage pricing theory, any (theoret-
ically) riskless portfolio with an expectation of positive
future returns must cost something now90,91. Expected
discounted returns can be estimated via a linear factor
model, based on market-wide risk premia and historic,
(mostly) de-correlated stock-specific returns. In the fac-
tor model of Ross90,91, risk premia which impact prices
may be due to exogenous or endogenous contributions.
Price changes which are different from noise are under-
stood to be caused by top-down exogenous factors. Nev-
ertheless, the resulting co-movements in prices may be
describable by endogenous factors within a given level
in the hierarchy of complexity, due to efficient assimila-
tion of exogenous information. In this model, systematic
deviations from predictions provided by the explanatory
factors cannot be sustained. Hence, over longer horizons
the only return that a portfolio should yield will be a
risk-free rate plus the risk premia associated with a finite
set of common risk factors.
It is generally accepted that real market dynamics are
much less trivial. Deviations from prices predicated by
prevailing models can arise. Such events may trigger
trade based on an expectation of profit due to detection
of a mispricing, even though the anomaly may only be
perceived due to a model-framed illusion111. More gen-
erally, bottom-up risk factors associated with a given in-
strument can influence the prices, such as price impact or
instantaneous liquidity effects in the presence of investor
herding26,79,102. Hence, price evolution may be driven
by both bottom-up and top-down causation, where the
latter are described by exogenous factors, leading to in-
novations in couplings and feedbacks through the many
layers of hierarchy within a financial system: between
countries, companies, investment funds, hedging strate-
gies, fund managers, dealers and traders, and bids and
asks in the price discovery process.
At different levels, which are characterised by different
phenomena, one expects different theories to function. At
some levels in the hierarchy there may be little stability in
these effective theories, while stability may be enhanced
at other levels. The effective theories that function at the
level of the price discovery process, bounded by the mar-
ket micro-structure at various exchanges on very short
time-scales, may be more stable than the dominant ef-
fective theories which drive prices at the level of invest-
ment strategies that operate on much longer time scales.
These in turn may be coupled together in complex and
interesting ways that are fundamentally nonlinear111.
It is also the case that different theories may be effec-
tive at the same level. The number of different plausible
theories is a decreasing function of available information,
since deeper or broader insight about system workings
can eliminate theories which become inconsistent under
the incorporation of new information.
In the next section we give an overview of how markets
may be mapped into a multilevel causality framework,
with consideration of key concepts. In Section III we
discuss specific agent-based models to be incorporated in
a hierarchy of complexity and in Section IV we clarify
how risk, information and innovation lead to emergent
prices in a concrete multilevel model. In Section V we
provide a general discussion of exemplars for actors which
drive top-down causation and our conclusion is given in
Section VI.
II. TOWARDS A HIERARCHICAL VIEW OF
FINANCIAL MARKETS
A. Reductionist perspectives
Notions of market equilibrium and price
efficiency24,41,73,74 are fundamental to orthodox models
in finance. Equilibrium dynamics in our application re-
late to how prices are influenced by risk and information
and how these are used by various agents in the system.
It useful to recall alternative views of how markets can
be considered to function in this regard:
EMH Efficient Market Hypothesis:37,93 Here prices are
fully rational, they reflect fair-value and are the
best predictors of future prices because price
changes can only be due to unpredictable news.
3This is a very broad aggregative perspective. This
is considered to be a normative idealised state that
captures salient features of stock market in equilib-
rium. Weakened forms of this perspective attempt
to reconcile this with actual market behaviour.
NMH Noisy Market Hypothesis:17,95 Here there is a mean-
ingful fair-price for companies, but speculative
noise trading pushes prices away from this fair-
value. This is a defense of the efficient market hy-
pothesis in that it provides a mechanism for prices
to deviate from fully rational prices. It is assumed
that there is a mean-field theory that can capture
the market’s salient features after the noise has
been averaged away.
AMH Adaptive Market Hypothesis:42,78 Here prices do
not necessarily reflect fair-values . The market is
a machine that sets prices. On the one hand, in-
efficiencies can be substantial, and on the other ,
patterns in prices may disappear as agents evolve
profitable strategies to exploit them. This repre-
sents a form of scientific pluralism and is a signif-
icant departure from the efficient market view in
that there is much more than just noisy deviations
from rational prices. There are instead many no-
tions of fair-value and there is no aggregate notion
of a fully rational price.
CDEM Critical Dynamical Equilibrium Market:21 Here
price diffusions are the result of a critical dynami-
cal equilibrium between persistent effects (liquidity
takers which correlate orders) and anti-persistent
effects (liquidity providers which generate mean-
reverting forces). No-one can know the fair-value
reference price, even if it existed. This is the state-
ment that there is no such thing as fair-value and
there is no mean-field theory that can capture all
salient market features.
Clearly these philosophical perspectives on what is at-
tainable offer very different modelling paradigms, rang-
ing from one where accurate prices exist as fundamen-
tal information, which can be discovered, to the as-
sumption that prices are emergent phenomena deter-
mined by agents acting on partial and potentially biased
information17,84.
To consider examples of the type of reductionism, one
need only look at Keynesian economics, as described
by Shiller3: instead of rational bottom-up agents, there
are animal spirits that lead to aggregate behaviour via
bottom-up causality which is greater than that allowed
within the efficient market perspective of bottom-up ra-
tionality. The approach is still reductionist and places
emphasis on the unique attributes of the agents, in par-
ticular, their behavioural characteristics make the whole
merely as an aggregate of its parts.
In view of consensus that financial markets are more
than reductionist13,31,42, we propose a mechanistic com-
bination of causal linkages between levels in a hierarchy of
complexity, in tandem with the set of causation classes
that act on these levels. Prices in such a system are
strongly influenced by both top-down risk factors as well
as information variables that constitute bottom-up and
top-down state-variables. The prevalence of such drivers
are time-varying and depend on market conditions as
well as actor interactions that exploit the market models
through various types of top-down causation. Key ques-
tions are: to what extent can an adequate characteriza-
tion of financial markets be carried out in a bottom-up
manner and which features of financial markets can only
be possible through top-down causation within a hierar-
chy of complexity?
B. Levels of complexity
Modelling financial market dynamics via a large num-
ber of interacting agents, who function at various levels
within a financial market, is of interest because it is a nat-
ural interpretation of real-world interactions. Relatively
simple models can be built to capture essential features
in the hierarchy of complexity.
In our approach, asset prices are key observable quan-
tities of the system and reflect how the system acts on
information, as conditioned by the prevailing classes of
causation driven by actors who make decisions.
We use the idea of actors, which serve as are exemplars
of causation types, to describe how effective theories at
different levels can be used to account for complexity and
adaption in a given financial market.
The following list summarises a hierarchy of complex-
ity at which effective theories hold, coupled to top-down
and bottom-up causation, in a manner consistent with
theoretical foundations:
Level 1 Individual agents generate buy and sell decisions
for an asset to generate aggregate price information
via an Ising model of agents on a lattice coupled to
an external field.
Level 2 Emergence of aggregate asset prices follows from a
Potts model for asset prices. This provides a frame-
work for bottom-up price emergence from collective
interactions in price dynamics which include top-
down influences, modelled by an external field.
Level 3 At this level, we propose an affine model which de-
scribes aggregate asset pricce fluctuations, driven
by net market interpretation of bottom-up informa-
tion variables and shared market risk factors. As-
suming that additional influences amount to long-
term, uncorrelated noise, this level can be repre-
sented by a neo-classic arbitrage pricing theory ap-
proach.
Level 4 Prices are impacted by shared, top-down financial
and economic factors which arise beyond trading
activity in financial markets.
4Level Model Processes
6 Meaning and Ethics
5 Market-structure.
4 Economic Factors.
(Section IV)
Macro-economic and Finan-
cial market generated risk
factors.
3 Asset price aggregation
(Section IVC)
Risk factors, information vari-
ables, and noise combine to
form aggregate assets prices.
2 Asset price emergence
(Section IIIB)
The collective behaviour of
assets generate noise in the
presence of different kinds of
information.
1 Agent interactions
(Section IIIA)
Agents buying and selling an
individual asset in the pres-
ence of different kinds of in-
formation to generate prices.
TABLE I: Hierarchy of complexity given by levels and associ-
ated processes. Levels can be coupled both up and down the
hierarchy through various feedbacks. Each level has a prevail-
ing effective theory that can be implemented as a model.
Level 5 Market structure incorporates the regulatory
framework prevailing within a market, across mar-
kets, as well as more generic market structure, seg-
mentation and market micro-structure. This level
influences and determines the nature of arbitrage
pricing and the attainable ranges for prices.
Level 5 Beliefs, meaning and ethics create and influence be-
haviour in the greater economy. This level of causa-
tion level abstracts how an economy may be organ-
ised psychologically through agent beliefs, anticipa-
tions, expectations, interpretations and ethics13.
The broad view considered is summarised in Table I,
where we represent structures and processes acting across
the levels of the hierarchy of complexity to capture the
key averaging scales of the system.
C. Computational implementations
Agent-based modelling is a well-established discipline
within heterodox economics14,33,47,65,77,106. We identify
actors 61,62, which serve as exemplars for the types of cau-
sation under consideration. An actor is a computational
model, which is used here to characterise a specific type of
top-down causation, and actors incorporate universal fea-
tures of the level at which they function. Hence, one may
differentiate between the concepts of agents and actors as
one differentiates between bottom-up, interacting model
components and top-down causation. Actors may explic-
itly accommodate concurrency and indeterminism and
the fact that there is a reduced set of causation classes
leads to a reduced set of actors, differentiated by their
actions.
Table II describes possible actors functioning across
the hierarchy of complexity.
Causation Type Exemplar Actor
TDC1 (section VA) “Predictors”
TDC2 (section VB) “Profiteers”
TDC3 (section VC) “Investors”
TDC4 (section VD) “Traders”
TDC5 (section VE) “Regulators, Rulers”
TABLE II: Actors serve as exemplars for causations. They
are able to act through-out the hierarchy of complexity given
in Table I.
The use of an actor model as a possible computation
metaphor to describe exemplars of possible core classes
of top-down causation is relevant as a complement to an
agent based modelling approach, which is effective for
capturing bottom-up interactions117. Financial markets
are evolving open-systems, a feature that poses interest-
ing problems for many computational models, for exam-
ple, a bottom-up agent based modeling framework and
actor models offer a relatively simple capacity to cope
naturally with indeterminism and concurrency.
Three core features characterise an actor61,62: (i) the
ability to process information, (ii) the ability to store in-
formation, and (iii) the ability to communicate. When
combined with it functional axioms: (A1) actors can cre-
ate more actors, (A2) actors can send messages and (A3)
actors decide what to do with the next message. Al-
though messages are delivered at most once, without du-
plication, the actor model is a many-to-many model in
which the use of a metaphor of identity of an actor and an
actor’s address can enable a single actor to be associated
with one or more addresses and enable one address to be
associated with one or more actors by their identity. This
creates the potential for a very fluid dynamic between ac-
tors that has the possibility of high-concurrency.
The next feature of interest is the actor model’s ability
to generate and handle indeterminism61. Indeterminism
is a foundational feature of any system that is truly con-
current, because there is nothing to ensure or tag the
order in which messages need to be managed. Hence,
the system has to order things by itself and in the ac-
tor model, indeterminism is handled naturally using the
concept of arbiters, which take simultaneous inputs and
generate sequential outputs.
A consequence of the actor model for computation
is that a global consensus is not possible. In the lan-
guage of spin-models, this can be understood in terms
of the phenomenon that there is no mean-field theory.
However, this feature encodes a deep form of pluralism
within a given system, where local arbitration is possi-
ble but one local view can really be quite different from
another. Such local positions can be inconsistent but
still be functionally important to the viability of the sys-
tem itself. Thus, the actor model can be used to encode
top-down causation, as distinct from the bottom-up cau-
sation which is natural to the agent based model perspec-
tive.
Conceptual issues relating to cohesion and coupling97
5are at the heart of approaches to fragility and robust-
ness in complex software systems. Here, we recall that
a goal of software development is to build a system with
with low-coupling and high-cohesion in order to create a
system which is both robust and fit-for-purpose97. Cohe-
sion relates to the degree to which elements in a system
belong together in terms of their function or responsi-
bilities. This is differs from procedural coupling within
a system, which is concerned with the degree to which
processes and components of the system depend or rely
on each other.
Since similar features are relevant for the modern fi-
nancial system, the actor model approach incorporates
economically meaningful elements: from a regulatory
perspective, one would be aim to avoid tight-coupling
(strong internal dependencies) in a financial market, par-
ticularly when the system may have low-cohesion and el-
ements of the system do not belong or connect.
D. Emergence
Aristotle claimed that7
The whole is something over and above its
parts, and not just the sum of them all...
Emergence refers to the concept that novel and
coherent, distinguishable structures or patterns can
arise during the process of self-organization in complex
systems6,7,28,50,87. Our approach is narrowly confined to
how random interactions lead to some form of weak emer-
gence due to feedbacks6,28,50.
Even though noise provides additional degree’s of free-
dom that are important for adaption17, it has been shown
that by adding uncorrelated noise to oscillators one can
induced explosive synchronization, i.e., very sharp phase
transitions76,98. Baraba´si and Albert show that for suf-
ficiently heterogeneous network topologies, simple corre-
lations can induce explosive phase transitions15.
Thus, the role of noise within the hierarchy of complex-
ity needs to be considered with care, since the related ca-
pacity for creating opportunities for innovation can pro-
vide pathways to tight-coupling and lead to fragility or
even catastrophic failure.
In order to understand the nature of the couplings
across the hierarchies, phenomenological features within
a given level must be identified to allow quantification
of coupling strengths. A mechanistic approach towards
monitoring may be futile within a highly adaptive com-
plex system, such as a financial market, since it is only
in hindsight that tightly-coupled paths of causation may
become apparent. It may be more feasible to identify
observable universal features of various top-down causa-
tion types at different levels in the hierarchy of complex-
ity, while discerning how bottom-up features may trigger
events based on tightly-coupled top-down and bottom-up
causation features.
III. AGENT-BASED PERSPECTIVES
A. An Ising market model for a single stock
Key strategies applied in agent based models to gen-
erate prices for a single asset are26,44,79:
• do what you neighbours do, which captures herd
behaviour of noise traders, for example as in the
Lux-Marchesi model79, and
• do what the minority does, which captures the be-
haviour of traders with opinion about the values of
trade-able asset.
These conflicting interactions have been combined into
a simple spin model by Bornholdt20 where the standard
nearest neighbour interactions capture the neighbour in-
teractions, while the coupling to the global observables
is captured via the global magnetization of the system.
In Bornholdt model the local field hi(t), which is used to
describe net demand or net price increment, takes on the
form:
hi(t) =
N∑
j=1
Jijsj − αCi(t)
1
N
N∑
j=1
sj(t). (1)
Here the model has i = 1, . . . , N spins with orientation
si(t) = ±1. The first term is the local Ising Hamiltonian
with nearest-neighbour interactions Jij = J and Jij = 0
for all other interactions. This induces order based on a
given scale of interaction. The second term is the global
coupling where a given strategy employed by the i-th
agent is captured by the spins Ci(t).
The local field determines the dynamics of the spins
according to
si(t+ 1) = +1 with p+ =
1
1 + e−2βhi(t)
, (2)
si(t+ 1) = −1 with p− = 1− p. (3)
The simple case described by Bornholdt sets Ci(t) = +1.
This creates a force that aligns the minority of spins in
the system. These types of traders can be considered as
fundamentalists as each agents tries to align relative to
fundamental value and as such are contrarian in nature;
this would suppress large fluctuations in the system.
The case with Ci(t) = −1 would cause alignment with
the majority of agents in the system and as such can be
considered a proxy for chartists where agents follow the
broad consensus views and as such herd with the global
behaviour; this cause global alignment of the system and
as such allows large fluctuations in the system.
For a fixed ratio of chartist and fundamentalist in the
system the chartist would dominate. Therefore, an in-
teraction term allowing for transitions between chartists
and fundamentalist was introduced20:
Ci(t+ 1) = −Ci(t) if αsi(t)Ci(t)
N∑
j=1
sj(t) < 0. (4)
6Here the idea is that an agent in the majority will choose
the strategy Ci(t) = +1 while the agent in the minority
will choose the strategy Ci(t) = −1 so that each agent
chooses a risky strategy for the prospect of higher re-
turns, but at a cost.
Agents will try to anticipate losses given a participa-
tion threshold and attempt to switch to that asset which
will become the next majority or minority asset depend-
ing on the trading strategy. This model takes on a simpli-
fied local field when strategy adjustments are considered
instantaneous:
hi(t) =
N∑
j=1
Jijsi − αsi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
N∑
j=1
sj ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (5)
with a global coupling constant α > 0. The first term
aligns spins, while the second terms causes the spins to
change sign if the global magnetization become large.
To understand the interpretation of the model in the
context of a financial market one can interpret the spins
states as demand for an asset. The magnetization term
varies with net demand and represents a function of ag-
gregate price change26,44:
X(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
sj . (6)
Price fluctuations are the observable property of the
system and a key success of this model is that it exhibits
intermittency and volatility clustering, as well as large
jumps in returns, without necessitating fine tuning. One
could introduce an additional parameter to index each
stock and in a more generic framework one should also
consider the excess demand in more generality, as a func-
tion of price and market depth in order to solve a market
clearing equation where the aggregate magnetization is
zero across the entire system.
For the descriptive purposes used here, we assume lin-
earity in demand function with a constant market depth
to allow us to view the magnetization as a measure of the
induced price changes118 .
We now move to a Potts model description of the price
dynamics of collections of stocks to introduce a second
level in our hierarchy of complexity.
B. A Potts model market for interacting stocks
Stocks whose prices evolve under correlated dynam-
ics may be group into co-evolving collections or clusters.
A key idea underlying such a group based stock pricing
model is that we seek to reflect two distinct features:
• a group of stocks have something in common, i.e.
the shared behaviour within a groups of stocks can
be described by modelling a the systematic compo-
nent.
• a stock’s price can include unique information, i.e.
the model should include non-systematic behaviour
which is unique to a particular stock.
One can apply the super-paramagnetic ordering of a
q−state Potts model directly for cluster identification18.
In a Potts model market, each stock may only belong to
one of q−states18,49,75 and each state can be represented
by a cluster of similar stocks. Cluster membership is
indicative of some commonality among the cluster mem-
bers and each stock has a component driven by state
dynamics and a component influenced by stock specific
noise. In addition, there may be global couplings that
influence all the stocks, represented by the external field
to model a market mode.
In this approach, the cost function can be interpreted
as a Hamiltonian whose low energy states correspond to
cluster configurations that are most compatible with the
data sample. Structures are identified with configura-
tions, denoted S = {si}
N
i=1, where the si denotes the
equivalence class or cluster to which the i-th object be-
longs. The Hamiltonian takes on the form:
H = −
∑
si,sj∈S
Jijδ(si, sj)−
1
β
∑
i
kisi. (7)
Here, the spins si range over q-states and can be inter-
preted as spins in the Potts model18,75, with ki serving
to tune external influences. The first term represents
common internal influences and the second term rep-
resents external influences. One can interpret the cou-
pling parameters Jij as being functions of correlation
coefficients49,75 in order to fix a distance function that
is decreasing with distance between objects. If all the
spins are related in this way, then each pair of spins is
connected by some non-vanishing coupling Jij = Jij(cij).
The case where there is only one cluster can be thought
of as a ground state. On the other hand, if the system
becomes more excited, then it could break up into ad-
ditional clusters. Each cluster would have specific Potts
magnetizations, even though the nett magnetization may
be zero. Generally, correlations may be both a function
of time and a temperature factor in order to encode both
the evolution of clusters as well as the hierarchy of clus-
ters modelled as a function of temperature.
We seek the the lowest energy state that fits the data.
In order to parameterize the model efficiently one can
choose to make the Noh ansatz83 and use this to de-
velop a maximum-likelihood approach49 rather than ex-
plicitly solving the Potts Hamiltonian numerically18,75.
In this investigation, we ignore the second term when fit-
ting data because we include shared factors directly in
later sections when we discuss information and risk and
the influence of these on price changes.
To interpret the system observables as being the clus-
ter configurations which evolve through time, the price
increments associated with the i-th stock may be given
by:
Xi(t) = gsiηsi +
√
1− g2siǫi, (8)
7where the cluster related influences are driven by ηsi
and the stock unique effects by ǫi. Both parameters are
assumed to be mutually independent Gaussian random
variables, with unit variance and zero mean116. The rel-
ative contribution of the group component to returns is
controlled by the intra-cluster coupling parameter gsi .
This model encodes the idea that stocks that have
something in common are in the same cluster but also
that stock membership in clusters is mutually exclusive
and that intra-cluster correlations are positive.
IV. HIERARCHIES, RISK AND EMERGENCE:
A MULTILEVEL MODEL
We exhibit how risk and information may be incorpo-
rated in a level within a hierarchical system such that
the basic features of arbitrage pricing theory are recov-
ered as a level within the hierarchy of causation. The
level is described by a family of linear risk and informa-
tion models, where a rationale for the family of models
is reviewed in detail in Wilcox and Gebbie111. We note
that more advanced stochastic modelling may be used to
analyse derivative securities in incomplete markets under
assumptions of semi-martingale dynamics for underlying
processes34,48,86.
First, we describe three simplified assumptions which
characterise a simple risk-based pricing model:
• Agents are only interested in means and covari-
ances for a view of the underlying distribution of as-
set prices and their relationship to underlying risks.
• Expected returns in excess of a risk-free asset only
depend on their relationship to shared risk factors
to reflect the idea that non-systematic behaviour
which is specific to a particular stock is short-lived.
• There is a unique risk-free asset for tractable risk-
neutral modelling perspectives.
Next we review a standard model for shared risks driv-
ing asset prices, using the idea of no-arbitrage pricing.
We then perturb this view by directly including informa-
tion variables.
A. Shared risk
The Fama and French38,40 model for accounting for
temporal risks associated with unanticipated returns,
ri,t+1 − Et[ri,t+1], (9)
has served as a standard approach to using arbitrage pric-
ing theory. More generally, the times-series of excess re-
turns may be modelled as follows:
ri,t+1 − Et[ri,t+1] =
P∑
p=1
βi,p,t [rp,t+1 − Et[rp,t+1]] + ǫi,t+1,(10)
where ri,t+1 is the excess return of the i-th stock and
rp,t+1 are the excess returns on the factor-mimicking
portfolios that proxy potential shared risks, here for the
p-th risk factor. This shared risk could be of a statisti-
cal nature, for example the eigenmodes of the correlation
matrices of asset price returns109, or they could be of a
fundamental nature. The ǫi,t are zero-mean noise contri-
butions which are uncorrelated with the risk factors, but
may be correlated across assets.
Now suppose the following serves as a model for the
conditional expected returns:
Et[ri,t+1] = αi,t +
P∑
p=1
βi,p,tEt[rp,t+1]. (11)
If this is substituted into Eqn. (10) and ri,t+1 is replaced
with r˜i,t+1, to indicate that the quantity is now the mea-
sured return (where rˆ is used to denote estimated re-
turns), then we obtain a conventional pricing model used
in financial economics40:
r˜i,t+1 = αi,t +
P∑
p=1
βi,p,tr˜p,t+1 + ǫi,t+1. (12)
Early convention wisdom was argued that if risk factors
in the model explain returns, then the alpha term, αi,t,
should be vanishingly small. The typical approach is to
use time-series regression to estimate a static beta for a
sample period, i.e. Et[βi,p,t] ∼ βˆi,p = Σˆi,p/σˆ
2
p based on
the sample estimated covariance matrix.
A limitation of this model is that there may be vari-
ables that influence asset prices in practice which have
little to do with shared risks. We refer to these variables
as shared information variables.
B. Shared information
Haugen and Baker (1996)56 provide a useful approach
in financial economics for incorporating shared informa-
tion variables. Their model has a similar form to that
for shared risks as in Eqn. (11), but expected returns
Et[ri,t+1] are now estimated in terms of lagged attributes.
The latter are typically company or asset specific at-
tributes which are bottom-up information variables, de-
noted by θ˜i,m,t, for the m-th source of information rel-
evant to the i-th stock at time t. The cross-sectional
model specification takes on a linear form as follows:
r˜i,t+1 = αt+1 +
M∑
m=1
δm,t+1θ˜m,i,t + ǫi,t+1 (13)
The conditional expected returns for the i-th stock can
be estimated by:
Et[ri,t+1] = Et[αt+1] +
M∑
m=1
Et[δm,t+1]θ˜i,m,t ∼ αi,t, (14)
8where the expected pay-off, Et[δm,t+1], to the lagged in-
formation variable can be estimated by a variety of means
to compute the expected conditional returns.
This model is not consistent with the Fama-French40 or
arbitrage pricing theory models. However, it includes fea-
tures which support avenues for top-down and bottom-up
feedbacks. In addition to the model’s practical useful-
ness, for small deviations from the arbitrage pricing the-
ory framework, one can combine information variables
with risk variables and retain a risk interpretation for
asset pricing in the long-time limit.
C. Information, risk and causation
Ferson and Harvey46 combine time-dependent risk fac-
tors in Eqn (11), the Et[rp,t+1], with lagged asset specific
information variables by conditioning the β coefficients
with time-dependence as follows: βi,p,t = βi,p,t(θi,m,t) :=[
b0i,p +
∑M
m=1 b
1
m,pθi,m,t
]
. This is analogous to the
manner in which the time-t expectation of δm,t+1 is com-
puted from θi,m,t for Eqn. (14). Hence, the following
model specification for the conditional expected returns
is obtained:
Et[ri,t+1] = αi,t +
P∑
p=1
βi,p,t(θi,m,t)Et[rp,t+1]. (15)
Thus, by substitution, the time t + 1 measurements
can be obtained by expanding Eqn. (10) to obtain the
following explanatory model for returns:
r˜i,t+1 =

αi,t +
P,M∑
p=1
m=1
b1m,pθ˜i,m,tr˜p,t+1


+
P∑
p=1
b0i,pr˜p,t+1 + ǫi,t+1, (16)
where writing in the original Haugen and Baker variables
would give the following representation:
r˜i,t+1 =
{
αi,t +
M∑
m=1
δm,t+1θ˜i,m,t
}
+
P∑
p=1
b0i,pr˜p,t+1 + ǫi,t+1. (17)
Since the estimated coefficients in Eqns (14) and
(15) are obtained by cross-sectional regression, the
model is nonlinear and has been supported by empiri-
cal evidence111. The combined model has two important
model features. Firstly, shared risk factors include time-
dependence on the information variables and secondly,
the model conforms with arbitrage pricing theory as long
as the non-vanishing bias terms, the so-called α terms,
only have short-term departures from being negligibly
small, and β’s are allowed to be time-dependent.
Using the above insight, we propose the following fac-
torisation of the right-hand-side of Eqn. (14) for a unify-
ing framework to incorporate top-down and bottom-up
economic information. The model is built on the two
sources of causality:
• generic information variables, denoted Zk,t for the
k-th source of top-down information, where Zk,t
referred specifically to macro-economic information
in46, and
• company specific variables, θi,m,t as in Haugen
and Baker56, which serve as bottom-up informa-
tion variables , now in a single unified framework.
Following the approaches of Haugen and Baker56 and
Ferson and Harvey46 by effectively conditioning the
coefficients of both the top-down market information
and bottom-up stock-specific information terms using
cross-sectional regression on previous-time top-down and
bottom-up information. This yields this following repre-
sentation for coefficients:
αi,t = α
0
i +
K∑
k=1
αi,kZ˜k,t,
βi,p,t =
P∑
p=1
[
b0i,p +
K∑
k=1
b2i,k,pZ˜k,t +
M∑
m=1
b1m,pθ˜i,m,t
]
.
Putting it all together we obtain:
r˜i,t+1 =

α0i +
K∑
k=1
α1i,kZ˜k,t +
P,K∑
p=1
k=1
b2i,k,pZ˜k,tr˜p,t+1


+
P,M∑
p=1
m=1
b1m,pθ˜i,m,tr˜p,t+1
+
P∑
p=1
b0i,pr˜p,t+1 + ǫi,t+1. (18)
This gives a theory that is driven by the returns of
shared risk as proxied by the factor-mimicking portfolios
rp,t but conditioned by top-down information variables
Zk,t (for example slowly changing economic features) and
bottom-up information variables θi,m,t (for example asset
specific features) in the presence of potentially correlated
noise ǫi,t.
This particular framework remains consistent with ar-
bitrage pricing theory111 and illustrates that, even within
arbitrage pricing theory, departures from equilibrium are
permitted through either top-down or bottom-up causa-
tion between different levels in the hierarchy of complex-
ity.
The finally modification we make to our model is to
modify the noise term to accommodate emergence and
9Variable Type Description Symbol Level
Risk factors The factor mimicking port-
folio for the p-th risk fac-
tor at time t+1 from state
variables Zk,t and θm,t.
rp,t+1 5-4
Top-down
information
The k-th shared state vari-
able at time t.
Zk,t 5-3
Bottom-up
information
The m-th state variable for
the i-th asset at time t.
θi,m,t 5-2
Cluster specific
noise
The noise term for si-th
clusters at time t.
ηsi,t+1 5-2
Asset specific
noise
The noise term for i-th as-
set at time t.
ǫi,t 5-1
TABLE III: The key variables in the model as driven by noise
formation using spin models and the top-down and bottom-up
information variables that describe both top-down risk factors
as well as there time-dependence. Actors are both able to
influence the state-variables as well as select for them as part
of the various causation classes.
complexity via innovations in coupling in the agent based
model. The key variables for the combined model are
summarised in Table III.
D. Emergence
In our model, we address scenarios where stocks group
together randomly on short-time scales due to liquid-
ity, or lack thereof, asynchronicity of trading or market
micro-structure effects, even if econometric similarities
and shared risk between assets still drive stock cluster-
ing over longer horizons. Such incidence could introduce
non-trivial lead-lag and feedback effects. To model this
idea, we apply the group model of Noh83 (following the
approach of Giada and Marsili49). This enables us to
consider a cluster noise term ηsi for unanticipated price
changes (due to the random fission and fusion of mu-
tually exclusive groups of assets) into order to describe
unanticipated returns in Eqn. (10) as follows:
ri,t+1 − Et[ri,t+1] = αi,t
+
P∑
p=1
βi,p,t [rp,t+1 − Et[rp,t+1]]
+gsiηsi,t+1 +
√
1− gsi
2ǫi,t. (19)
Here, as before, si denote Pott spins of the cluster that
the i-th stock currently resides in and ns denote finite,
but variable number of such clusters in the market at
any given time. The binding strength of the si-th clus-
ter components is given by gsi , the uncorrelated cluster
specific noise is described by ηsi,t and the stock specific
uncorrelated noise which is independent of random clus-
ter emergence is denote by ǫi,t for the i-th stock.
The final step in our model specification is to pass to
conditional expected returns in Eqn. (19) above, anal-
ogous to the manner that expected future returns were
described in Eqn. (10).
Causation Type Typical Response to Noise
TDC1 (section VA) Noise is a hinderance and under-
mines the adopted model.
TDC2 (section VB) Noise effects are reduced because
a fixed goal is aimed at averaging
away noise.
TDC3 (section VC) Noise facilitates or is exploited in
the long-term through adaption.
TDC4 (section VD) Noise both facilitates and is cre-
ated for adaption under selection.
TDC5 (section VE) Noise both facilitates and is cre-
ated and system goals and selec-
tion criterion are adapted to ex-
ploit accordingly.
TABLE IV: The table summarises some typical responses of
the causation classes to noise and the feedbacks associated
with noise.
We have demonstrated a model which couples together
different parts of a hierarchy of complexity and which
permits random innovation leading to innovation, into
a single pricing equation. Before concluding, we dis-
cuss specific examples of top-down causation and possible
roles.
E. Block variables and hierarchies of complexity
It is well understood that money serves the purpose of
smoothing over mismatches in supply and demand at the
level of direct bartering to facilitate transactions. More
generally, the ability to transact instantaneously can be
measured by estimating liquidity. Black17, Ellis36 and
Kirman and Helbing58 observe that noise is a fundamen-
tal feature of complex adaptive systems because it adds
slack by allowing additional degrees of freedom to the
set of options available in a given systems. We consider
how noise modelling in complex systems facilitates fea-
tures such as the ability or incentive to adapt through
selection. Typical responses of the top-down causation
classes to noise generated in complex adaptive systems
are given in Table IV.
One approach to modeling a hierarchy of complexity
within a spin system is by using block variables, following
the renormalisation group approach29,51,53,71,102,113. The
rationale is that larger block domains can be representa-
tive of higher complexity structures119102,113 that arise
in critical systems with structures on different scales.
Such systems may typically exhibit one of three broad
regimes: (i) the regime where noise effects are mini-
mal and ordering across the system is maximal, (ii) the
regime when noise effects dominate the system and or-
dering effects are minimal, and (iii) the critical regime
where changes in the scale of the system do not change
the behaviour or properties of the system as the system
balances between order and possibility of saturation by
noise.
The first limitation of a block variable view is that
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stocks are not seen as emergent properties of the sys-
tem. Secondly, we have already posited that a complex
financial market cannot be determined fully by using only
bottom-up averaging implicit in such a block variable ap-
proach. Thus, representing a stock’s price as magnetiza-
tion of a particular block may not be sufficiently realistic.
Nevertheless, as an approximation towards modeling a
hierarchy of complexity, we argue that the analogies are
useful.
We have provided particular, ad hoc representation
and approximation of the processes driving price incre-
ments via emergence, whereby the stock itself, in the
sense of the existence of a company, is not an emergent
property of the system, but the price of a stock is.
More generally, one may model companies in a complex
exchange economy as represented by stock prices, which
arise as emergent properties of the system, with top-down
and bottom-up causation features in agreement with the
more general situation. This would entail a progression in
models from many agents trading a single stock, to agents
trading groups of stocks, and so on, up to the point where
one has many agents trading the market, and groups of
markets within a global system. As in models for physical
systems, the insight of averaging to identify dominant
dynamics in each level can help build an effective model
that agrees with the observed phenomenology at each
scale.
In the scheme described in this paper, the top-down
risk and information variables, (rp,t and Zk,t), respec-
tively, can be view as external fields in the effective
models, while the bottom-up information variables θi,m,t
serve to model structural features of the system itself.
This offers a simplified, but quantitative perspective of
the interaction complexities which can and do occur in
financial markets.
Viewing the system through a lens of such a hierarchy
of complexity can lead to insights at various levels. At
a given level, one may consider attempting to regulate
interactions, for example to be constrained by produc-
tivity or transformative goals9. However, this may be
ineffective if either there is significant adaptation at time-
scales which are shorter than those of regulatory response
or emergence is susceptible to noise effects or random
bottom-up interactions, possibly triggered by regulation
itself.
Top-down control can also induce noise effects in lower
levels, which may amplify or induce bottom-up effects
that may swamp any attempts of control the system.
In such cases, impacts on one set of system variables
Zk,t and θi,m,t may induce new states, for example of
shared risks, and modify evolution dynamics, as reflected
in changes in other connected variables.
When viewing the system from lower levels in a hier-
archy of complexity, one may well become increasingly
convinced of a critical dynamical equilibrium view of the
markets. However, an efficient market view may seem
valid when viewing the same system through the lens
of pricing models with time-scales which allow averag-
ing away of noise effects. Neither view may be entirely
wrong. If there is indeed a hierarchy of complexity within
the system, there may be times at which both can be
right or wrong. Hence, a hierarchy of complexity can be
consistent with the realities of scientific pluralism inher-
ent in many complex adaptive systems.
Thus, even the choice of parameters in pricing models
and how models are used becomes related to the type of
causation models adopted by agents in the system. In
the next section we discuss as a selection of examples for
classes of actors in models of financial markets.
V. TOP-DOWN CAUSATION ACTORS
We discuss the causality classes and the actors used to
represent them, as described in Table II, with interest in
how they respond to noise, as described in Table IV, and
respond to and influence the information variables Zk,t
and θi,m,t, that in turn influence the risk factors rp,t, as
described in Table III. The five types of actors reviewed
are discussed with more general examples in Ellis36, §4.2.
Our discussion is by no means comprehensive and further
examples may be expanded44.
A. Algorithmic top-down causation
This view of causation in financial markets is essen-
tially a deterministic, dynamical systems view. This can
serve as an interpretation of financial markets whereby
markets are understood through assets prices, represent-
ing information in the market, which can be described by
a dynamical system model. This is the ideal encapsulated
in the Laplacian vision63:
We ought to regard the present state of the
universe as the effect of its antecedent state
and as the cause of the state that is to fol-
low. An intelligence knowing all the forces
acting in nature at a given instant, as well
as the momentary positions of all things in
the universe, would be able to comprehend in
one single formula the motions of the largest
bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the
world, provided that its intellect were suffi-
ciently powerful to subject all data to anal-
ysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the
future as well as the past would be present to
its eyes. The perfection that the human mind
has been able to give to astronomy affords but
a feeble outline of such an intelligence. [1814]
Here boundary and initial conditions of variables
uniquely determine the outcome for the effective dy-
namics at the level in hierarchy where it is being ap-
plied. This implies that higher levels in the hierarchy
can drive broad macro-economic behavior, for example:
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at the highest level there could exist some set of differ-
ential equations that describe the behavior of adjustable
quantities, such as interest rates, and how they impact
measurable quantities such as gross domestic product,
aggregate consumption.
The literature on the Lucas critique94 addresses limi-
tations of this approach. Nevertheless, from a completely
ad hoc perspective, a dynamical systems model may of-
fer a best approximation to relationships at a particular
level in a complex hierarchy.
Example: Predictors: This system actor views
causation in terms of uniquely determined outcomes,
based on known boundary and initial conditions. Predic-
tors may be successful when mechanistic dependencies in
economic realities become pervasive or dominant.
An example of a predictive-based argument since the
Global Financial Crises (2007+) is the bipolar Risk-
On/Risk-Off description for preferences27,81, whereby in-
vestors shift to higher risk portfolios when global assess-
ment of riskiness is established to be low and shift to
low risk portfolios when global riskiness is considered
to be high. Mathematically, a simple approximation of
the dynamics can be described by a Lotka-Volterra (or
predator-prey) model. The excess-liquidity due to quan-
titative easing and the prevalence and ease of trading
in exchange traded funds and currencies, combined with
low interest rates and the increase use of automation, pro-
vided a basis for the risk-on/risk-off analogy for analysing
large capital flows in the global arena.
In our Ising-Potts hierarchy, top down causation is fil-
tered down to the rest of the market through all the
shared risk factors, rp,t and the top-down information
variables, Zk,t, which dominate bottom-up information
variables, θi,m,t. At higher levels, bottom-up variables
are effectively noise terms. Nevertheless, the behaviour
of the traders in a lower levels can still become driven
by correlations across assets, based on perceived global
riskiness. Thus, risk-on/risk-off transitions can have am-
plified effects.
B. Top-down causation via non-adaptive
information control
In this class of causation, in-built and unchanging goals
determine the outcome. In general, a goal refers to any
targeted outcome. In capitalist economics, the primary
goal of maximization of individual and corporate profit is
one of the most pervasive, unchanging goals in financial
systems, second perhaps only to the objective of attaining
a living wage. As a result, the profit motive is encoded
in a variety of structural features in the modern finan-
cial systems, including remuneration structures, the tax
regime, the legal framework for the flow of capital and
the flow of labour, legal structures deployed to manage
corporations.
Example: Profiteers: Since most other capitalist
goals are subsumed by quests for profit, we refer to the
dominant class of actors operating in this paradigm as
the Profiteers. While the use of goals may damp out the
effects of randomness as the system is driven towards pre-
selected goals17120, top-down causation of the profiteers
can also lead to necessary conditions for financial crises.
The history of finance is littered with examples of corpo-
rate malfeasance that fit into this category of top-down
causation, from WorldCom and Enron, and through to
the various banking scandals resulting in billions of dol-
lars worth of litigation2
Particularly striking is the ease with-which collusion in
financial systems may occur when the profit motive dom-
inates decision making. This can occur when bottom-up
information variables, θi,m,t, concerning individual cor-
porate credit ratings, debt cover or book-values, etc,
which initially drive the system, become manipulated
with disinformation, but are nevertheless presented in a
sanitized manner. Through agent responses, this can in
turn influence the behaviour of shared-risks in the market
which arise out of aggregating the information in θi,m,t
and Zk,t.
C. Top-down causation via adaptive selection
Fixed, high-level goals guide outcomes of stock se-
lections in this class of causation. This paradigm is
geared towards optimal deployment of assets via max-
imization of an appropriate utility function (which acts
as a fixed meta goal), to allow risk-return decisions to
be made in the face of uncertainty. Such decisions are
more general than profit maximization. More specifi-
cally, in Markowitz optimization for example, which is
equivalent to maximising quadratic utility under assump-
tions of Gaussian increments, investors choose to maxi-
mize wealth using the means and covariances.
Example: Investors: The influential actors in this
class may be referred to as Investors. To adopt a top-
down causation model with adaptive selections, investors
require markets to be sufficiently efficient, with depar-
tures from equilibrium that are short-lived, uncorrelated
noise. Such investors have an idealised sense of being able
to diversify risk as a meta goal and, hence, the idea of
being able to optimally deploy capital. Unpredictability
enters the dynamics due to randomness. In general, high
level selection criteria have the advantage of exploiting
randomness in an ensemble of options121.
From a theoretical point of view, this causation class
is a dominant source of top-down causation in financial
markets. Deviations away from asset prices determined
by the shared-risk factors are assumed to be sufficiently
small to become negligible and correlations in the noise,
due to activities lower in the hierarchy, are also regarded
as negligible. This means that the direct impact on in-
formation variables, Zk,t or θi,m,t are either random or
have short-lived effects and that only aggregates effects
are of concern for risk variables rp,t. This may drive as-
set prices to cluster in groups via the shared risk-factors
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when capital is deployed based on those shared-risks.
D. Top-down causation via feedback control of
adaptive goals
This class of causality is characterised by adaptively
selected goals, which respond to context and are used
to guide the outcomes36. Consider, for example, market
participants who incorporate information about demand
and random fluctuations, to offset risks for more opti-
mal trading. This can be carried out by implementing
different trading strategies, contingent on prevailing con-
ditions.
Example: Traders: Participants in the market
which may serve as an exemplar for this causation class
include market-makers, who facilitate transactions at all
times, and traders, who interact with the market on be-
half of clients for fees.
The dynamic nature of goals, conditioned on past in-
formation, may cause groups of agents to herd based on
common objectives22. Here the behaviours of agents are
based on the information variables, Zk,t and θi,m,t, and
shared-risks rp,t, with goals updated based on past states
of the system as well. We note that this type of causa-
tion may include both bottom-up and top-down effects.
Goals may be selected to guide outcomes based on prop-
erties of the system which reside higher in the hierarchy,
for example, a trader may observe the spread between
a pair of tradeable securities and make trading decisions
in terms of price levels, while at the same time using her
balance sheet to influence and move the prices themselves
to trigger or action ad hoc outcomes. Noise variables ηsi
may become significant if correlations in the noise become
dominant.
E. Top-down causation with adaptive selection of
adaptive goals
Examples: Regulators and Rulers: Regulators
attempt to act on a financial market based on the intel-
ligent and reasonable formulation of rules. For example,
changing the market micro-structure at the lowest level
in the hierarchy, can change the way that asset prices
assimilate changes in information variables Zk,t or θi,m,t.
Similarly, changes in accounting rules could change the
meaning and behaviour of bottom-up information vari-
ables θi,m,t and changes in economic policy and policy
implementation can change the meaning of top-down in-
formation variables Zk,t and influence shared risk factors
rp,t.
In hierarchical analysis, theories and plans may be
embodied in a symbolic system to build effective and
robust models to be used for detecting deeper de-
pendencies and emergent phenomena8,54,59,82. Mecha-
nisms for the transmission of information and asym-
metric information information have impacts on market
quality1,52,84,85,89,104,105,111. Thus, Regulators can im-
pact the activity and success of all the other actors, ei-
ther directly or indirectly through knock-on effects. Ex-
amples include the following: Investor behaviour could
change the goal selection of Traders; change in the latter
could in turn impact variables coupled to Traders activ-
ity in such a way that Profiteers are able to benefit from
change in liquidity or use leverage as a mean to achieve
profit targets and overcome noise.
Idealistically, Regulators may aim for increasing pro-
ductivity, managing inflation, reducing unemployment
and eliminating malfeasance. However, the circumven-
tion of rules, usually in the name of innovation or by
claims of greater insight on optimality, is as much part
of a complex system in which participants can respond
to rules. Tax arbitrages are examples of actions which
manipulate reporting to reduce levies paid to a profit-
facilitating system. In regulatory arbitrage, rules may
be followed technically, but nevertheless use relevant new
information which has not been accounted for in system
rules. Such activities are consistent with goals of profi-
teering but are not necessarily in agreement with longer
term optimality of reliable and fair markets.
Rulers, i.e. agencies which control populations more
generally, also impact markets and economies. Exam-
ples of top-down causation here include segregation of
workers and differential assignment of economic rights to
market participants, as in the evolution of local miners’
rights in the late 1800’s in South Africa and the national
Native Land act of 1913 in South Africa, international
agreements such as the Bretton Woods system, the Mar-
shall plan of 1948, the lifting of the gold standard in 1973
and the regulation of capital allocations and capital flows
between individual and aggregated participants.
Ideas on target-based goal selection are already in cir-
culation in the literature on applications of viability the-
ory and stochastic control in economics9,86. Such ap-
proaches provide alternatives to the Laplacian ideal of
attaining perfect prediction by offering analysable future
expectations to regulators and rulers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to address the need for more realistic economic
models which include feedbacks, adaptive goal-seeking,
emergence and the occurrence of crises, we have consid-
ered the applicability of a particular hierarchical mod-
elling approach36 by considering specific model interac-
tions.
In Section IV, we provided a consistent set of coupled
models, incorporating causation at differently levels in
the hierarchy, driven by top-down sources, realised as
actors, and bottom-up information variables. The model
incorporates the possibility of emergence, via random in-
teractions, but is still consistent with no-arbitrage equity
models at relevant scales, and can be calibrated for fore-
casting, based on historic data. We find the actor-based
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perspective of causation sources to be useful for identi-
fying feedbacks and non-trivial features, which influence
whether the system is in fact fit-for-purpose, in the sense
of having low-coupling and high-cohesion. Here, insights
can be derived from both the qualitative features of ac-
tors and actor interactions as well as the quantitative
outputs of simulations.
Since economies can only be run once, unlike small
experiments in controlled laboratory conditions, it be-
comes completely relevant to scrutinise as much infor-
mation as possible when stipulating and enforcing (or ac-
tively not enforcing) the economic impact of laws. While,
no human-constructed model is ever likely to include all
significant information and dynamics, increased comput-
ing power, advances in complex systems modelling and
better quantification of system information may yield
insight-producing simulations for better economic deci-
sion making.
The specific instantiation of a hierarchical model dis-
cussed in this paper is by no means a unique solution to
the challenge of finding relevant hierarchical models in
financial economics. Different actors may impact differ-
ent components of the system and more than one theory
may be effective for a given level in the hierarchy under
scrutiny. Thus, the approach is comprehensive and plu-
ralistic, provided consistency constraints are maintained
at the interfaces between models, for investigating multi-
layer models in finance.
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